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Android Security: A Survey of Issues, Malware
Penetration and Defenses
Parvez Faruki, Ammar Bharmal, Vijay Laxmi, Vijay Ganmoor, Manoj Singh Gaur and Mauro Conti
Abstract—Android smartphones are gaining big market share
due to several reasons, including open architecture and popular-
ity of its application programming interfaces (APIs) in developer
community. In general, smartphone has become pervasive due
to its cost effectiveness, ease of use and availability of office
applications, Internet, games, vehicle guidance using location-
based services apart from conventional voice calls, messaging
and multimedia services.
Increase in number of Android smartphone and associated
monetary benefits has led to an exponential rise in Android
malware apps between 2011-2014. Academic researchers and
commercial anti-malware companies have realized that conven-
tional signature based and static analysis methods are vulnerable
against prevalent stealth techniques such as encryption, code
transformation and analysis environment detection approach.
This realization has led to the use of behavior based, anomaly
based and dynamic analysis methods. As one single approach
may be ineffective against above techniques, complementary
approaches may be combined for effective malware app detection.
Though many reviews extensively cover smartphone OS secu-
rity, as Android smarthphone have captured more than 75%
market, we believe a deep examination of Android security,
malware growth, anti analysis methods and mitigation solution
specifically for android is required. In this review, we discuss
Android security enforcement and its issues, Android malware
growth timeline between 2010-2013, malware penetration and
anti-analysis techniques used by malware authors to bypass
analysis methods. This review gives an insight into the strength
and weakness of known research methodologies and thus provide
a platform for research practitioners towards proposing next
generation Android security, malware analysis and malicious app
detection methods.
Index Terms—Android Malware, Static Analysis, Dynamic
Analysis, Behavioral Analysis, Obfuscation, Stealth Malware
I. INTRODUCTION
Android smartphone Operating System has captured more
than 75% of the total market-share, leaving its competitors
iOS, Windows Phone and Blackberry far behind [1]. Even
though smartphones were used in the previous decade, launch
of iOS and Android has changed the landscape by generating
an enormous attraction worldwide among consumers and
developers alike. Smartphones have become ubiquitous due
to wide range of connectivity options, such as GSM, CDMA,
Wi-Fi, GPS, Bluetooth and NFC. Gartner report of year 2013
shows an increase of 42.3% in smartphone sales from 2012
[1]. Comparison between total sales in year 2012 and 2013 is
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shown in the Figure 1. It shows an increase of 12% from 66 to
78 for Android and its nearest competitor iOS’s sale declines
by 4% from 19 to 15. Always-on internet connectivity and
personal information such as contacts, messages, social net-
work access, browsing history, bank transactions have attracted
malware developers also towards smartphone OS platforms in
general and Android in particular due to its popularity. This
has led to the rise of Android malware such as premium-
rate SMS Trojan, spyware, botnets, aggressive adware and
privilege escalation exploits distributed through third-party and
official app-stores.
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Fig. 1: Mobile OS sales comparison between 2012 and
2013 [1]
Android’s popularity among users has made the develop-
ers provide innovative applications (popularly called apps).
Google Play, official Android app market hosts third-party
developer apps with a nominal fee providing moderate control.
Google Play hosts more than one million apps [2] with large
number of downloads each day. Unlike Apple market app-
store, Google Play does not verify uploaded apps manually.
Instead, Google Play relies on Bouncer, a dynamic emulation
environment to protect itself from malicious app threats. It
would provide protection against threats, but cannot analyze
the vulnerability of existing apps [3]. Malicious apps may
trick vulnerable apps to divulge user’s private information
that inadvertently harms the reputation of the latter. Moreover,
Android does not recommend, but allows installation of third-
party apps on device, which has stirred up dozens of regional
as well as international app-stores [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. However,
protection and quality of apps available in third-party app-
stores is a matter of concern [9].
Android security solution providers report an alarming rise
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of malware from just three families and mere 100 samples
in 2010, to more than hundred families with 0.12-0.6 million
unique samples [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]. The number
of malicious apps uploaded on VirusTotal [16] is doubling
every year. Malicious apps are using clever ways to bypass
existing security mechanisms provided by Android OS as
well as anti-malware products such as stealth techniques,
dynamic execution, code obfuscation, repackaging and en-
cryption [17] [18]. Existing malware propagate by employing
above techniques to defeat signature-based approach used by
anti-malware products. Thus, new mechanisms that adapt and
provide timely response to such techniques are important.
Proactive approaches are needed to detect unknown variants
of known malware with less number of signature updates, in-
contrast to one signature for each known malware.
Malware app developers gain smartphone control by ex-
ploiting platform vulnerabilities [19], stealing sensitive user
information [17], getting monetary benefits by exploiting
telephony services [20] or creating botnet [21]. Thus, it is
important to understand their operational activities, mode of
working and usage pattern in recent past to devise proactive
detection methods.
Huge increase in malicious apps has forced anti-malware
industry to carve out robust methods for efficient detection on
device under existing constraints. Majority of anti-malware
still employ retrospective signature based detection due to
implementation simplicity and efficiency [22]. Signature based
methods can be easily circumvented through code obfuscation,
necessitating a new signature for every malicious sample [23]
and that is why an anti-malware client has to regularly update
its signature database. Due to limited processing capability
and constrained battery power on a smartphone, cloud-based
solutions for analysis and detection came into existence [24]
[25]. Signature generation needs expertise and patience for
each malware sample as it may incur false positives while
detecting unknown variants of a known malware family. Due
to increasing number of malware and their variants, there is a
need to employ automatic signature generation and detection
incurring low false positive rate.
Off-device detailed analysis of malware is required to under-
stand its functionality. Analysis of samples can be done man-
ually to extract robust signatures out of them. However, given
the rapid rise of malware, there is need for analysis methods
that need minimum human intervention, helping malware ana-
lyst to generate timely solution of new malware. Static analysis
can quickly and precisely identify malicious patterns, but fails
against code obfuscation as well as dynamic code execution
on Android [26]. Thus, dynamic analysis approaches, though
time-consuming, are used to extract malicious behavior of
samples using stealth techniques, by executing them in a
sandbox environment.
Academic and industry researchers have proposed many
solutions and frameworks to mitigate malicious app threats
since the launch of Android in 2008, some of which are open-
source. These solutions can be characterized basically using
following three parameters:
1) Goal of the proposed solution can be either app-security
assessment, analysis or malware detection. App-security
assessment solutions try to find out vulnerabilities in
apps, which if exploited by an adversary, can harm
the user and device security. Analysis solutions check
for malicious behavior within unknown apps, whereas
detection solutions aim to prevent existing malware from
installing on the device.
2) Methodology to achieve above goals can be static anal-
ysis based approach that is used to identify behavior of
apps without actually executing them. Control-flow and
data-flow analysis are example implementations of for-
mal static analysis. In Dynamic analysis based approach,
apps are executed/emulated in a sandboxed environment,
in order to monitor their activities and identify behaviors,
which are otherwise difficult or impossible using static
analysis approach.
3) Deployment of the above solutions.
Existing survey papers on smartphone security review the
state of the art in general considering all popular OS plat-
forms [27] [28], while this review paper mainly focuses on
Android OS. In particular, La Polla et al. [28] surveyed
smartphone security threats and their solutions for the period
2004-2011, which has very limited coverage for Android OS.
Suarez-Tangil et al. [27] extended the work of La Polla et
al. [28]. In particular, they concentrated on attacks based on
related smartphone feature misuse such as hardware, commu-
nication, sensors and system, which gives good insight into
how utilizing certain features of Android will affect overall
security of the device. Suarez-Tangil et al. categorized malware
based on their attack goals, distribution & infection and
privilege acquisition. On the contrary, we categorize malware
as per anti-malware industry’s terminology, which aims to
provide more accurate view of malware infection rate and
threat perception for period 2010-13.
In 2011, William Enck [29] studied the security mechanisms
available in Android, particularly, protection through permis-
sions and security implications of inter-app communication.
Moreover, he discussed other third-party Android platform
hardening solutions, their benefits and limitations. He also
examined various app security analysis proposals and gave
future direction to enhance them.
We aim to complement former reviews by expanding the
coverage of Android security issues, malware growth during
2010-13, their penetration, stealth techniques and strength
as well as weaknesses of some of the popular mitigation
solutions. In particular, we comprehensively cover stealth
techniques used by malware authors to evade detection by
generating variants of existing Android malware. We also
propose a hybrid framework for Android malware analysis
and detection, which gives insight into our future research
direction. This survey paper is organized as follows:
• Section II discusses the Android architecture, application
structure and inter–component communication.
• Section III discusses security enforcement done at various
level within Android and Section IV covers its issues with
respect to user’s security.
• Section V categorizes Android malware according to their
functionality and Section VI covers various penetration
techniques used by them.
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• Section VII discusses obfuscation and stealth techniques
employed by malware.
• Section IX outlines assessment, analysis and detection
methodology and their deployment methods.
• Section X reviews state of the art tools for app-security
assessment, analysis and malware detection proposed by
academia and anti-malware industry along with their
strength and drawbacks.
• Finally, Section XI concludes the survey by evaluating
state of the art tools. We also propose an Android
malware analysis and detection framework that employs
both static and dynamic analysis techniques, as a recom-
mendation for future research direction.
II. BACKGROUND
Android is being developed under Android Open Source
Project (AOSP), maintained by Google and promoted by Open
Handset Alliance (OHA), which consists Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs), chip-makers, carriers and developers.
Android apps are developed in Java, however, native code
and shared libraries are coded in C/C++. Typical Android
architecture is shown in Figure 2. The bottom layer is Linux
kernel tuned specifically for embedded environment with
limited resources. Android is based on Linux kernel due to
its robust driver model, existing drivers, memory and process
management, networking support along with other core ser-
vices. Currently, Android fully supports two Instruction Set
Architectures: 1) ARM, prevalent in smartphones, Tablets;
2) x86, prevalent among Mobile Internet Devices (MIDs).
On the top of Linux kernel are native libraries to support
high performance third-party reusable libraries and in-house
functionality. Java code is translated into Dalvik byte code that
Fig. 2: Android Architecture [30]
runs under newly created Java runtime, called Dalvik Virtual
Machine, optimized for limited resource availability on mobile
platform. After booting of OS completes, a process called
zygote initializes Dalvik VM by pre-loading all core libraries
and waits, through a socket, for new process creation requests
to be forked from itself. This makes new app-process cre-
ation very fast. Finally, application framework layer provides
uniform and concise view of Java libraries for use by apps.
Android runs its sensitive functionality such as telephony,
GPS, network, power-management, radio and media as system
services, which are again protected with permissions.
A. App Structure
An Android app is packaged into a .apk file, which is tech-
nically a zip archive, consisting of several files and folders as
shown in Figure 3. In particular, AndroidManifest.xml
file contains meta-data about an app, such as package name,
permissions required, definition of one or more components
like Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers or Content
Providers, minimum and maximum platform version sup-
ported, libraries to be linked against and so forth. res folder
consist of icons, images, string, numeric, color constants, UI
layout, menus, animations etc. compiled into binary format.
assets folder contains non-compiled resources and its direc-
tory structure is maintained. classes.dex contains Dalvik
executable bytecode to be run under Dalvik Virtual Machine.
META-INF folder contains app digital signature, as well as,
developer certificate used for verification and identification
respectively.
As mentioned before, Android apps are written in Java
language. App building process is shown in the Figure 4.
Compilation of Java code creates number of .class files,
containing intermediate Java-bytecode, for each Java class in
source. Using dx tool, those .class files are converted into
a single Dalvik Executable (dex) file. Dex file contains Dalvik
Archive
Assets CERT.RSA
CERT.SF
MANIFEST.MF
lib
Meta-INF
res Drawable
Layout
Other
XML Files
AndroidManifest.xml
classes.dex
resources.arsc
App
Fig. 3: Android PacKage (APK) Structure
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, VOL. 00, NO. 0, FEBRUARY 2014 4
Fig. 4: App Building Process
bytecode, which runs under register-based Dalvik Virtual
Machine, unlike stack-based JVM.
B. App Components
In Android, an app is functionally divided into one or more
components given below:
• Activity: It is the user interface component of an app.
Arbitrary number of activities can be declared in manifest
file depending on the requirements. Apart from perform-
ing some pre-defined task, an activity can also return the
result to its caller. Activities are launched using Intents
(explained in the next subsection).
• Service: It is a component without any user interface.
A service is generally used to perform background pro-
cessing, for example, playing an audio or downloading
data from network. Services are launched using Intents
(explained in the next subsection).
• Broadcast Receiver: This component listens to the
events, which are generated by the system, for example,
BOOT_COMPLETED, SMS_RECEIVED etc. Other apps
can also broadcast their application-defined events, which
can be handled by other apps using this component.
• Content Provider: This component is also known as data-
store, providing a consistent interface for data access
within app or to other apps. Externally, data within
the content provider appears in the form of relational
database, but internally it can have completely different
storage implementation. Data-store is accessible through
application-defined Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs).
Each component may be accessible to other apps, de-
pending upon whether they are exported. Listing 1 shows
an example definition for each of the component in
AndroidManifest.xml. Each component can get invoked
or executed independent of others. Thus, Android app has mul-
tiple entry-points, depending upon the number of components
it is made-up of.
C. Inter-component Communication
Exported components of apps interact with each other
using a high-level abstraction for inter-process communication,
called Intent, internally handled by Binder driver. Apps invoke
activities and services as well as send broadcast events using
Intents only. Also, system events are broadcasted through
Intents. Intent can contain explicit address of the receiver
component using class/package name field. Otherwise, de-
pending upon the presence of action, category and data fields,
system implicitly sends Intent to the matching one or more
receiver component. Each component registers itself to receive
Intent(s) using one or more intent-filter, which also specifies
the kind of action, category and/or data it can accept. For
example, in Listing 1, service component will be invoked
only when it receives system Intent with action equals to
BOOT COMPLETED.
1 <uses−permiss ion
2 and ro i d : n ame=” android . permiss ion . INTERNET” />
3 <uses−permiss ion
4 and ro i d : n ame=” android . permiss ion .READ PHONE STATE” />
5 <uses−permiss ion
6 and ro i d : n ame=” android . permiss ion .RECEIVE SMS” />
7
8 <a c t i v i t y a n d r o i d : l a b e l =”@string / app name”
9 and ro i d : n ame=”com .myapp .Main”>
10 <i n t en t−f i l t e r>
11 <ac t i on and ro i d : n ame=” android . i n t e n t . a c t i on .
MAIN” />
12 <ca tegory
13 and ro i d : n ame=” android . i n t e n t . ca t egory .LAUNCHER” /
>
14 </ i n t en t−f i l t e r>
15 </ a c t i v i t y>
16
17 <r e c e i v e r and ro i d : n ame=”com .myapp . SmsReceiver ”>
18 <i n t en t−f i l t e r>
19 <ac t i on
20 and ro i d : n ame=” android . i n t e n t . a c t i on .SMS RECEIVED
” />
21 </ i n t en t−f i l t e r>
22 </ r e c e i v e r>
23
24 <s e r v i c e a n d r o i d : e n a b l e d =” true ”
25 and ro i d : n ame=”com .myapp . MyService”
26 a n d r o i d : p e rm i s s i o n =” android . permiss ion . INTERNET
”>
27 <i n t en t−f i l t e r>
28 <ac t i on
29 and ro i d : n ame=” android . i n t e n t . a c t i on .
BOOT COMPLETED” />
30 </ i n t en t−f i l t e r>
31 </ s e r v i c e>
32
33 <prov ider and ro i d : n ame=” Student sProv ider ”
34 a n d r o i d : a u t h o r i t i e s =”com .myapp . MyProvider”>
35 </ prov ider>
Listing 1: Snippet from AndroidManifest.xml with
components
III. ANDROID SECURITY ENFORCEMENT
Android has been designed with security in mind from the
very inception with the aim to protect user data, apps, the
device and the network [30]. However, overall security de-
pends on the developers’ willingness and capability to employ
best practices. Also, user must be aware of the effect that
some app can have after installation, on its data and device’s
security. Anti-malware solutions on Android cannot handle
malware aggressively due to security model enforced on apps.
For example, anti-malware apps have limited scanning and/or
monitoring capability for other apps or file-system in the
device. In this section, we revise the security features provided
by Android platform.
A. Application Sandboxing
At kernel level, Android utilizes DAC (Discretionary Access
Control) feature of Linux, by assigning every app process a
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unique UID, so that an app cannot interfere with other apps
or system services. Android also protects network access by
implementing a feature called Paranoid Network Security,
through which Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Internet access services run in
different groups [31]. If some app has been granted permission
for particular network access (e.g., Bluetooth), process of that
app is assigned into corresponding group. Thus, apart from
UIDs, a process may get assigned one or more GIDs. Android
app sandboxing is shown in Figure 5.
An app must contain a PKI certificate signed by the devel-
oper who created it (see Figure 4). Signing is the point of trust
between Google and developers, so that developers are sure
that their apps are provided to the users unmodified, and they
only are responsible for their apps’ behavior. This signing is
used for placing an app to its sandbox by assigning unique
UID. If certificate of an app A matches with some already
installed app B on the device, Android assigns the same UID
(i.e., sandbox) to app A as app B, allowing them to share
each others’ private files and permissions. For this reason, it
is strictly not advisable that developer should share its own
certificate with others.
B. Permissions at Framework-level
To restrict every app from accessing important
functionality of a smartphone such as telephony,
network, contacts/SMS/sdcard and GPS location, Android
provides permission-based security model at application
framework level. App must declare the permissions it
want to access using <uses-permissions> tag in
AndroidManifest.xml file as shown in the Listing 1.
By default, app has no permission to perform actions that
would affect other apps, system or user, and thus, it runs with
a very limited capability. Thus, restrictions are enforced, on
specific operations an app (process) can perform, at the time
of installation itself.
Android permissions are divided into following four
protection-levels [32]:
1) Normal: These permissions has minimal risk for the
device, system and users. They are granted automatically
at the time of installation.
2) Dangerous: These permissions has higher risk and give
app the access of private data and important features
of the device. They must be granted by users before
installation.
3) Signature: These permissions are granted only if request-
ing app is signed with the same certificate as the app that
declared the permissions. They are granted automatically
at the time of installation.
4) SignatureOrSystem: These permissions are granted only
if requesting app is signed with the same certificate
as the Android system image or app that declared the
permissions. They are granted automatically at the time
of installation.
Permissions in Android are coarse-grained, for exam-
ple, INTERNET permission does not have capability to re-
strict access to particular Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
domain(s). Also READ_PHONE_STATE permission allows
to check if phone is ringing or in hold, at the same
time it allows to read phone identifiers. Permissions like
WRITE_SETTINGS, CAMERA are also similarly broad, thus
violating least privilege access principle. Permissions are also
not hierarchical, for example, WRITE_CONTACTS does not
imply READ_CONTACTS, it must be requested separately.
Same is the case with READ_SMS and WRITE_SMS. At the
time of installation, user is asked to grant either all or no
permissions. Often, users are unable to judge the appropri-
ateness of certain permissions requested by apps and expose
themselves to risk [33].
C. Secure System Partition
System partition of smartphone contains Android’s kernel,
system libraries, runtime, framework and applications [30].
Android makes system partition read-only to protect unau-
Fig. 5: Android Apps within Sandbox at Kernel-level [30]
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thorized access and modification. Also, some part of file-
system such as application cache and sdcard are secured with
appropriate privileges to prevent tampering from adversary
when device is connected with the PC using USB port.
D. Secure Google Play Store
Google discourages users to install apps from sources other
than its own Play Store due to security reasons. Before making
any app available for users to download, Google verifies it
with Bouncer, a dynamic analysis service that executes app
in a sandboxed environment to ascertain its normal behavior.
Bouncer, if not invincible [34], is a reasonably effective secu-
rity mechanism. Android also provides a verification service
at the time of installation for apps downloaded from other
sources. Google Play also has the ability to remotely un-install
an app if it is found to be malicious later [35].
E. Other Security Enhancements
SELinux has been integrated into Android since Jelly Bean
4.3 to provide greater security [36]. It imposes Mandatory Ac-
cess Control (MAC) policies over the traditional Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) on the device. In DAC, it is the owner
of the resource who decides which other interested subjects
can access it, in contrast, in MAC, it is the system (and not
the users) that authorizes subjects for accessing the resource.
Thus, MAC has the potential to prevent any malicious activity
even though root access has been compromised. This reduces
the effect of kernel-level privilege escalation attacks, attempted
by taking advantage of vulnerable processes that run with root
privilege.
Information on the device can also be ex-filtrated by con-
necting it to a PC through USB using Android Debug Bridge
(ADB) driver. ADB driver is created mainly for the debugging
purposes, through which one could install/uninstall apps, read
system partitions etc. even though device is locked prior to
Jelly Bean 4.2.2. To prevent unauthorized access, Android
authenticates any ADB connection using RSA keypair [37].
Also, Android prompts user for allowing access to the device
through ADB connection on the device’s screen, so if device
is locked, attacker would not be able to gain access to that
device.
Android has also removed setuid()/setgid() pro-
grams [37] which were vulnerable for some time as many
root exploits had been written based on them.
Many independent Android security enhancement mecha-
nisms have been proposed [38] [39] [40] [41]. These mech-
anisms allow an organization to create finer grained security
policies for their employees’ devices. Various context infor-
mation such as phone location, installed apps’ permissions
and inter-app communication can be actively monitored and
verified against their corresponding policies. Scope of this
paper is to investigate issues related to Android malware and
we do not aim to examine these prevention mechanisms.
IV. ANDROID SECURITY ISSUES
This section briefly walks through the issues that are im-
portant for user and device security in general.
A. Update Problem
Android Open Source Project (AOSP), led by Google,
upgrades and maintains Android source-code. But releasing
new versions/updates to the end-users remain the responsibility
of Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) or wireless
carriers. Individual OEM branches out newer version of
Android and customizes it accordingly. In some countries,
wireless carriers also customize the OEM’s version to suit
them. This whole update chain process takes months before it
finally reaches the end-users. This phenomenon is known as
Fragmentation problem, where different versions of Android
remain scattered among consumers. Specifically, handsets with
older and un-patched versions may be vulnerable to publicly
available exploits.
Updates for Android OS are seemingly frequent compared
to their PC counterparts as there have been 25 stable releases
since September 2008 [42]. Over The Air (OTA) new version
update significantly changes the existing version by adding
and modifying large number of files across Android platform,
ensuring integrity of existing user data and apps [43]. New
version update is facilitated through a service called Package
Management System (PMS). Luyi Xing et al. [43] performed
a comprehensive study of pileup vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by malware apps in case of new version upgrades.
For example, an app for older version can declare dangerous
permissions in AndroidManifest.xml that have been
introduced in next version(s). During the update process,
Android does not ask user to verify newly active permissions
in that existing app and grants them automatically [43]. Thus,
it compromises security of the device.
B. Native Code Execution
Android allows native code execution through libraries
implemented in C/C++ using Native Development Kit (NDK).
Even though native code executes outside Dalvik VM, it
is sandboxed through user-id/group-id(s) combination. Native
code has the potential to execute publicly available root-level
exploits across older Android versions [19] [44] [45].
C. Types of Threats
Even though AOSP is committed to provide a secure
smartphone OS, it is susceptible to social-engineering attacks,
using which malicious apps can perform many undesirable
activities. Following is a list of malicious activities that have
repeatedly happened or can happen across Android versions.
• Privilege escalation attacks are done by leveraging pub-
licly available kernel-level vulnerabilities [46] to gain root
access of the device. It can also happen by exploiting one
or more vulnerable components of an app that makes use
of dangerous permission(s) granted to it.
• Privacy leak or personal-information theft happens when
users grant dangerous permissions to malicious apps that
read sensitive data and ex-filtrate them without users’
knowledge or consent.
• Malicious apps can also spy on users by monitoring calls,
SMS/MMS, bank mTANs, recording audio/video without
users’ knowledge or consent.
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• Malicious apps can earn money by making calls or
subscribing via-SMS to premium-rate numbers, without
users’ knowledge or consent.
• Compromise the device to act as a Bot and remotely
control it through a server by sending various commands
to perform malicious activities.
• Aggressive ad campaigns may entice users to download
malicious apps.
• Colluding attack happens when set of apps, signed with
same certificate, gets installed on a device. These apps
would share UID with each other, also any dangerous
permission(s) requested by one app will be shared by
all others. Collectively, these apps can perform malicious
activities, while individually they may seem perfectly
normal. For example, an app with READ_SMS permission
can read SMSes and ask its related app with INTERNET
permission to ex-filtrate them.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attack can happen when app(s)
overuses already limited CPU, memory, battery and band-
width resources, blocking users from using the device.
V. REPORTED ANDROID MALWARE THREAT PERCEPTION
Figure 6 shows the time-line of some notable malware
families of Android during 2010-2013. Among them, SMS
Trojans has a major contribution, some of which have infected
even Google Play [48]. Large number of malicious apps have
also exploited root-based attacks such as rage-against-the-
cage [19], gingerbreak [45] and z4root [44] to gain superuser
privileges for availing control of the device. Recent addition
in the exploitation techniques is the master-key attack [49],
which has left devices from Android version 1.6 to JellyBean
4.2.2 vulnerable.
Quarterly, each anti-malware company reports about An-
droid malware threats [50] [51]. These companies also dif-
fer in the approximation of malware infection-rate among
Android users. In particular, Lookout Inc. reported that the
global malware infection-rate by likelihood is 2.61% for its
users [52]. Moreover, two independent research also estimated
real infection-rate. Lever et al. [53], used the Domain Name
Resolution (DNS) traffic of smartphones in United States
and found 0.0009% infection rate. Very recently, Truong
et al. [54] instrumented a well-known Carat app [55] to
estimate infection-rate for three malware datasets. They found
infection-rate 0.26% and 0.28% for McAfee and Mobile-
Sandbox dataset respectively. Therefore, at present the threat
perception on Android malware is wide ranging and house
remains divided in numbers.
In the following, we discuss Android malware classified
accordingly to their characteristics.
A. Trojan
Trojans masquerade themselves as benign apps, but they
perform harmful activities without consent or knowledge of
the users. Trojans may leak confidential information of the
user to outside, or they may ”phish” the user to provide
sensitive information such as passwords. Till second quarter
of 2012, majority of variants belonged to the SMS Trojan
family. Apps of this family can send messages to premium
rate numbers without consent and thus incurring financial loss
to the user. Apart from that, they also leak contacts, messages,
IMEI/IMSI numbers to unknown domains. FakeNetflix [56]
masquerades itself as popular Netflix app, phishing the user
to enter their login credentials. Fakeplayer [57], Zsone [51]
and Android.Foney [58] are other examples of Trojan, which
incur financial loss to the user.
Due to increase in mobile banking transactions, malware
authors have targeted two-factor authentication used by mobile
banking firms. After capturing username and password of bank
accounts using social engineering attack, Zitmo and Spitmo
Trojans listen for mTANs (Mobile Transaction Authentication
Numbers) to silently complete transactions [59].
B. Backdoor
Backdoor allows entry to the system bypassing all security
procedures and facilitates installation of other malicious apps
into the system. Backdoor generally uses root-level exploits to
gain superuser privilege, so that it can hide itself from other
security apps, or worse it may disable them also. Number of
root-level exploits have been leveraged such as rage-against-
the-cage [19] and gingerbreak [45] to gain full-control over the
device. Basebridge [48], KMin [48], Obad [18] are example
of well-known backdoor apps.
C. Worm
Worm app can create an exact or similar copies of itself
and spreads them through network or removable media. For
example, Bluetooth worms can send copies to other devices via
Bluetooth automatically. Android.Obad.OS [18] is one such
example that can spread malicious apps via Bluetooth.
D. Botnet
These type of apps compromise the device to create a Bot,
so that the device is controlled by a remote server, called Bot-
master, through a series of commands. Network of such bots
is called a Botnet. Commands can be as simple as sending
private information to remote-server or as complex as causing
a denial of service attack. Bot can also include commands
to download malicious payloads automatically. Geinimi [48],
Anserverbot [48], Beanbot [48] are well known examples of
botnets.
E. Spyware
Spyware may present itself as a good utility, but has a
hidden agenda to surreptitiously monitor contacts, messages,
location, bank mTANs etc. to perform wrongful actions at later
stage. They may also send all the collected information to
the remote server. Nickyspy [48], GPSSpy [51] are known
examples of spyware.
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Fig. 6: Android Malware Family Chronology [47] [15] [14] [10] [12] [11]
F. Aggressive Adware
Android provides coarse and fine grained location services.
Shady ad affiliate networks misuse them to bombard users with
personalized advertisements. Notable behavior of this type of
apps is the creation of shortcuts on home-screen, bookmarks,
changing default search engine settings, push unnecessary
notifications etc. which hinders user’s effective use of the
device. Plankton [51] is an example of well known aggressive
adware.
G. Ransomware
This type of app locks the device and makes it completely
inaccessible until some ransom amount is paid through online
payment service. For example, FakeDefender.B [60] malware,
after installation, shows fake malware alerts masquerading as
avast! [61] antivirus. After that, it locks the device and asks
user to pay a ransom amount to remove threats and unlock it.
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VI. MALWARE PENETRATION TECHNIQUES
In this section, we summarize penetration techniques used
by Android malware.
A. Repackaging Popular Apps
Repackaging is a process of ripping-off popular free/paid
apps from one app-store, adding malicious payload into them,
and distributing them through other third-party app-stores. App
is repackaged using reverse-engineering tools and techniques.
Repackaging process is illustrated in the Figure 7. In the fol-
lowing, we report the main steps involved in app repackaging:
• Find popular free/paid app from some renowned app-
store and download it on PC.
• Disassemble the app using tools such as apktool [62].
• Write malicious payload either directly in Dalvik byte-
code, or in Java and then convert it into Dalvik bytecode
using dx [63] tool.
• Add that payload into benign app. Make necessary
changes in AndroidManifest.xml and resources, if
any.
• Assemble modified source again using apktool.
• Finally, distribute repackaged app by self-signing with
another certificate to other app-stores for free.
Repackaging is one of the most common technique to
spread malicious activities. More than 80% samples among
Malware Genome Dataset are repackaged ones [9] from the
legitimate apps. This technique can be repeated for any number
of popular apps, or can add different malicious payload
each time using the same app. This technique can also be
used to generate number of variants of existing malware. As
signature of each malware variant gets changed, anti-malware
solution with fixed number of signatures cannot identify them.
Repackaging is one of the biggest threats as it can pollute
the centralize distribution system and financially hurts the
original developer. Rogue elements can even repackage apps
for diverting advertisement revenues.
AndroRAT APK Binder [64] tool can repackage and Tro-
janize any legitimate app automatically by adding Remote
Access functionality as a payload. Adversary from remote
location, using GUI, can make infected device send SMS
messages, make phone-calls, access device location, record
video or audio and access files from device’s storage.
B. Drive-by Download
An attacker can employ social engineering, aggressive ad-
vertisements and click-jacking attacks to make user mistakenly
download malicious apps. As soon as user visits a malicious
URL, it downloads a malicious app automatically, optionally
may disguise itself a legitimate one to be able to get permission
from the user to install itself. Android/NotCompatible [21] is
a notable example of drive-by download attack.
C. Dynamic Payload
An app can also embed malicious payload in the form
of apk/jar file, either encrypted or in plain format, into
the resources. After the installation, when app executes, it
optionally decrypts the payload. If payload is in the form of
jar file, then using the DexClassLoader API, it loads
payload into Dalvik VM dynamically to execute it. Otherwise,
it will ask the user for confirmation to install the embedded
apk by disguising itself as some important update. App
can also execute native binaries using Runtime.exec API,
which is roughly equivalent to fork()/exec() in Linux.
BaseBridge [48] and Anserverbot [48] malware families adopt
this technique. Some malware families does not embed ma-
licious payload as a resource, but rather download it from a
remote server. DroidKungFuUpdate [48] is one such example
of dynamically executing payload from a remote server. This
type of penetration technique is very difficult to detect using
fixed signature based or static analysis methods.
VII. STEALTH MALWARE TECHNIQUES
Android works under the condition of low processing power
and limited memory as well as battery availability. Anti-
malware apps cannot perform real-time deep analysis of apps
due to above constraints, unlike PC counterpart. Malware
authors view these inabilities of anti-malware apps as an
opportunity to make their malicious payload highly obfuscated
to hide themselves from anti-malware signatures. Stealth tech-
niques such as code encryption, key permutations, dynamic
loading, reflection code and native code execution remain a
matter of concern for signature-based anti-malware solutions.
Code obfuscation is evolving on Android platform as
well [65] [66], following the trends of their PC counterparts.
Obfuscation techniques in general are employed for one or
more of the following purposes.
1) To protect proprietary algorithm within app from rivals
by making reverse-engineering very difficult.
2) To protect Digital Rights Management of multimedia
resources in order to reduce piracy.
3) Developers perform obfuscation on their apps to make
them more compact and thus faster.
4) Malware authors use obfuscation to hide itself from
anti-malware scanners and deep-analysis for a longer
duration, so that it can propagate and infect more and
more devices.
5) Prevent or at least delay human analysts or automatic
analysis engines from figuring out the intention of
malicious code.
As Android app contains Dalvik bytecode, it is amenable
to reverse-engineering due to type information available such
as class/method types or definitions, variables, registers and
literal strings along with instructions. Code transformation
techniques are applied on Dalvik bytecode to optimize it,
for example, Proguard [67] is an Android as well as Java
obfuscator. Proguard is an optimization tool to remove unused
classes, methods and fields. Meaningful class, method, field
and local variable names are replaced with smaller names to
make it difficult to understand their purpose. Dexguard [68]
is a commercial Android code protection tool. Advanced code
obfuscation techniques like class encryption, method merging,
string encryption, control flow mangling are employed with
Dexguard to protect app from reverse-engineering.
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Fig. 7: App Repackaging Process
This section covers various code transformation methods
employed by malicious apps to make itself obfuscated and
generate large number of variants. In fact, code transformation
can also be applied in such a way to make disassembling
erroneous [69].
A. Junk Code Insertion and Opcode Reordering
Junk code or no-operation code (nop) is a well-known
technique used to change executable size and evade anti-
malware signatures. Inserting junk code in the app preserves
the semantics, but changes the opcode sequence. Opcode can
also be re-ordered by putting goto instructions in-between
to preserve the original execution. These methods can be
successfully used to fool the signature-based or opcode-based
detection solutions [65] [66].
B. Package, Class or Method Renaming
Every Android app on app-store is generally identified by
a unique package name. Dalvik bytecode also contains names
of all classes and methods in it. Some malware signature
may depend upon the package, class or method names of
some malicious app for detection [70]. Even though trivial,
by changing those names, a malicious variant can evade
detection [66].
C. Altering Control-flow
Some anti-malware may generate signatures by analyzing
control-flow graphs (CFGs) of malicious apps in order to
detect them [70]. CFGs can be modified by simply adding
unnecessary goto instructions or by inserting and calling junk
methods. Even though trivial, this technique can successfully
evade anti-malware signatures [66].
D. String Encryption
Literal strings within a program such as messages, URLs
and shell-commands reveal a great deal about an app under
inspection. To prevent analysis, those strings can be encrypted
in order to render them unreadable. Also, each time string
encryption is applied, different encryption methods (or keys)
can be used to make it difficult to automate decryption. In that
case, literal strings can only available during execution, thus
frustrating static analysis methods.
E. Class Encryption
Important code such as license-checks, paid downloads and
DRMs can be hidden by encrypting entire classes those deal
with them [68].
F. Resource Encryption
Content of resources, assets and native libraries can be
encrypted, modifying their access code in order to decrypt
them at runtime [68].
G. Using Reflection APIs
Static analysis methods mainly look for Android API calls
within malicious apps to inspect their behavior. Java reflection
allows us to programmatically create class instances and/or
method invocation using literal strings. To identify exact class
or method names, data-flow analysis must be leveraged. But,
because those literal strings can also be encrypted, as we have
seen before, it rather becomes impossible to automatically find
those API calls, hindering the static analysis.
VIII. APPROACHES FOR ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS AND
DETECTION
Android security solutions such as vulnerability assessment,
analysis and malware detection are broadly divided into two
types: 1) Static; 2) Dynamic. Static methods are quick, but it
has to deal with false-positives carefully. Dynamic methods,
though time-consuming, are very helpful when apps are highly
obfuscated. Hybrid approaches those leverage both static as
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well dynamic methods are also exist due to the limitations of
both.
Security solutions can be either rule-based [71] or they
can extract features to create a machine-learning model [72].
Inappropriate feature selection can degrade the performance
of model, generating false-positives (i.e., false detection of
benign apps). Moreover, the number of features under problem
should be small and effective, in order to make solution feasi-
ble to use in real-time. Feature reduction methods along with
strong statistical measures such as mean, standard deviation,
chi-square, haar transforms can help us identify prominent
features. Learning model can then be created by giving above
features to clustering or classification algorithms.
A. Static Approach
Static analysis based approaches work by just reading or
disassembling apps under consideration, without executing
them. They can miserably fail against various obfuscation
techniques we covered in Section VII.
1) Signature-based Malware Detection: Most of the current
Android anti-malware products use this efficient approach
for malware detection on device. It can extract interesting
syntactic or semantic features [73] to find signature(s) that
matches with existing database. Signature-based methods be-
comes ineffective if variants of existing malware are generated
through polymorphism. Moreover, fast signature generation
and its distribution becomes very important in the times of
malware outbreak. Parvez et al. [74] devised a prototype,
called AndroSimilar, to automatically extract signatures and
detect zero-day variants of existing malware.
2) Component-based Analysis: In order to perform de-
tailed app-security assessment or analysis, an app can
be disassembled to extract important content such as
AndroidManifest.xml, resources and bytecode. Mani-
fest file contains important meta-data about an app in question,
such as list of components (i.e., Activities, Services etc.)
and required permissions. App-security assessment solutions
can analyze components using their definition and interaction
within bytecode to find out vulnerabilities [3] [75] [76].
3) Permission-based Analysis: Permission to access sensi-
tive resource is the central design point of Android security
model, so that no application, by default, has any permission
that affects user’s security. By just looking at permission
requests, it is not possible to decide whether an app is
malicious, but nevertheless, it is an important feature to assess
the risk associated by granting them all [77] [78].
Sanz Borja et al. [79] used <uses-permission>
and <uses-features> tags present in
AndroidManifest.xml file as features. They applied
machine learning algorithms, such as Naive Bayes, Random
Forest, J48 and Bayes-Net on a dataset consisting of 249
malicious and 357 benign apps. Huang Chun-Ying et al. [80]
has also used requested permissions apart from other manifest
features, then applied machine learning algorithms on a
dataset consisting of 1,25,249 malicious and benign apps.
Enck et al. [81] developed a certification tool, called Kirin,
used to define set of rules regarding the combination of
certain permissions requested by an app.
4) Dalvik Bytecode Analysis: Dalvik bytecode contains
useful, semantically rich, type information such as classes,
methods and instructions. We can utilize them to verify app’s
behavior. Detailed analysis using control-flow, data-flow can
throw light upon some of the dangerous functionality per-
formed by apps such as privacy leakage and telephony services
misuse [26] [71] [82]. Control-flow and data-flow analysis may
also help de-obfuscated bytecode, for example, usage of Java
Reflection API [83].
Control-flow analysis of bytecode helps in identifying pos-
sible paths that can follow during execution. Dalvik bytecode
contains jump, branch and method invocation instructions that
alter the order of execution. To facilitate further analysis, we
can generate an intra-procedural (i.e., spans single method)
or inter-procedural (i.e., spans across methods) control-flow
graph (CFG) of the bytecode. Karlsen et al. [83] formalized
the Dalvik bytecode in order to perform control-flow analysis
on it.
Data-flow analysis of bytecode helps in predicting possible
set of values at some point of execution. We can use CFG
to traverse possible execution paths. In the same way as
control-flow, we can perform data-flow analysis either at intra-
procedural or inter-procedural level, among which latter one
improves approximation of the desired output. In particular, we
can perform a special type of data-flow analysis, called con-
stant propagation, to find constant arguments of some sensitive
API calls during execution. Consider for example, a malicious
app that sends premium SMSes, if that app sends SMSes to
some hardcoded numbers, using constant propagation data-
flow analysis they can be retrieved [71]. Another special
type of data-flow analysis, called taint analysis, tracks the
variables that hold some important information. For example,
taint analysis can identify privacy leakage within apps [82].
We can also utilize API-calls within bytecode to identify
malicious behavior [84] as well as similar apps [85]. Zhou
et al. [9] utilized just sequence of opcodes within Dalvik
bytecode instructions to catch repackaged (i.e., similar) apps.
5) Re-targeting Dalvik Bytecode to Java Bytecode: Avail-
ability of number of Java decompilers [86] [87] [88], as
well as static analysis tools based on it [89] [90] [91], has
motivated some researchers to re-target Dalvik bytecode to
Java bytecode. Enck et al. [92] developed ded tool that can
convert Dalvik bytecode to Java. Later, they performed static
analysis on Java such as control-flow, data-flow, using Fortify
SCA [91] framework. Octeau et al. [93] developed Dare tool
to convert Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode with nearly 99%
accuracy. Bartel et al. [94] developed Dexpler plugin for
static analysis framework called Soot [89]. Dexpler converts
Dalvik bytecode into Soot’s internal Jimple code, however, it is
unable to handle optimized dex (odex) files. Gibler et al. [95]
employed ded and dex2jar [96] to convert Dalvik bytecode
into Java and Java bytecode respectively, and used static
analysis framework called WALA [90] to identify privacy
leakage within Android apps at large scale.
B. Dynamic Approach
Although static approaches for analyzing apps are quick,
they fall short of detecting encrypted and new malware to
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much extent. And here comes the role of dynamic approaches,
where we execute the app in a protected environment, pro-
viding all the emulated resources it needs, making it feel
at home, thereby learning its malicious activities. Although
dynamic analysis on Android seems to be very new, there
exists notable research in this field. As, execution of apps
in Android is event based, it is important to trigger those
events. UI gestures such as tap, pinch, swipe, keyboard and
back/menu key press must be automatically triggered, in order
to make app perform various activities. Android SDK comes
with a tool, called monkey [97], to automate some of the above
gestures. In order to perform in-depth monitoring of an app,
one may need to change some part of the Android OS, this
technique is known as Instrumentation.
A serious drawback of dynamic approach is that some
malicious execution path may get missed, if it is triggered
according to some non-trivial event, for example, at particular
time of the day. Also, other anti-emulation techniques such
as detecting sandbox environment [34] and performing mali-
cious activities after some time delay can successfully evade
dynamic analysis. Dynamic approaches can be broadly divided
into following three categories.
1) Profile-based Anomaly Detection: Malicious apps may
perform Denial of Service (DoS) attack by over utilization
of constrained hardware resources. Range of parameters at
different layers of Android subsystem are collected, such as
CPU load, memory statistics, network traffic, battery usage
and system-call access sequence, from benign as well as
malicious apps. After that, machine learning methods are
applied on the collected data in order to distinguish abnormal
behavior [72] [98].
2) Malicious Behavior Detection: Specific malicious be-
haviors like sensitive data leakage, sending SMS/emails, mak-
ing calls without user’s consent can be accurately detected
by tapping or monitoring those particular areas of inter-
est [99] [100].
3) Virtual Machine Introspection: The downside of mon-
itoring app behavior within emulator (VM) is that emulator
itself is susceptible of being compromised by a malicious
app, there by defeating our purpose. To counter this, Virtual
Machine Introspection approach can be employed, in which,
behavior of apps is observed external to the emulator [101].
IX. DEPLOYMENT FOR ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS AND
DETECTION APPROACHES
Security assessment, malware analysis and detection meth-
ods can be deployed at different places, depending on the
requirement, from on-device to completely off-device.
A. On-Device
Signature-based malware detection is provided as apps
by many anti-malware companies due to its efficiency and
simplicity. But, as noted before, detailed assessment as
well as analysis is difficult to perform on device, because
of constraints within smartphones and Android subsystem.
Lightweight risk assessment by analyzing components and
permissions can also be done on smartphones [81]. Following
are some of the limitations of anti-malware apps for providing
robust protection within devices.
• Anti-malware apps run as any other normal app without
special privileges. As a result, they are also under the
purview of process isolation. Because of this, they cannot
directly scan other app’s memory and private files for
malware detection.
• Though Android allows running background services of
apps, it can stop anti-malware app services while running
out of resources. Even other apps can stop an anti-
malware app from executing, if they have appropriate
privileges.
• Without acquiring root privileges, anti-malware app can-
not create system hooks for monitoring file-system or
network access.
• Without acquiring root privileges, anti-malware app can-
not uninstall other malicious apps automatically, it must
rely on users to uninstall them.
B. Distributed (Some part On-Device, Some part Off-Device)
Though quick assessment or detection can be performed on
the device itself, detailed and computationally expensive anal-
ysis can be performed at remote server. Continuous availability
of bandwidth and its cost is a concern, but at the same time
signature database in the smartphone can be greatly reduced to
make anti-malware app limited-resource friendly. In the case
of profile-based anomaly detection, resource usage as well as
other parameters can be collected at client-side to send them
to remote server for detailed analysis, and finally, results can
be sent back to the device.
C. Off-Device
It is important to automate deep analysis of new malware
samples, so that human analysts can quickly understand them
and find mitigation solutions. This type of automated deep
analysis solutions require more computational power as well
as memory. Because of this, they are usually deployed off-
device [71] [26] [101] [82] [72].
X. STATE-OF-THE-ART TOOLS FOR ANDROID APP
ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS, AND DETECTION
Industry and academia have proposed several solutions for
analysis and detection of Android malware. In this section,
we survey and examine promising reverse-engineering tools
and detection approaches. Detection approaches have been
classified according to the following: 1) Goal, which can be
app-security assessment, analysis and/or malware detection; 2)
Methodology as discussed in Section VIII; 3) Deployment as
discussed in Section IX.
A. Reverse-Engineering Tools
Content of Android package (APK) is stored in a binary
format for efficiency. Before assessment, analysis or detection
task begins, it is important to disassemble it to make further
processing easier. There are number of tools available to
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disassemble or de-compile APK files. In the following, we
note some of the popular reverse-engineering tools.
1) apktool [62] can decode binary content inside APK into
nearly original form in project-like directory structure.
It disassembles binary resources and converts bytecode
within classes.dex into smali [102] syntax for easier
reading as well as manipulation. After making any
changes, it can also repackage it back into APK. This
tool seems to be the best among all reverse-engineering
tools.
2) dex2jar [96] is a disassembler that can parse both dex
and optimized dex file, providing a light-weight API to
access it. dex2jar can also convert dex file into a jar
file, by re-targeting Dalvik bytecode into Java bytecode,
for further manipulation. Moreover, it can also assemble
back jar into dex after modification.
3) Dare [103] project aims at re-targeting Dalvik bytecode
within classes.dex to traditional .class files us-
ing strong type inference algorithm. This .class files
can be further analyzed using vast range of traditional
techniques developed for Java applications, including de-
compilers. Octeau et al. [93] demonstrated that Dare is
nearly 40% more accurate than dex2jar.
4) Dedexer [104] disassembles classes.dex into
Jasmin-like syntax, by creating separate file for each
class, along with package directory structure, for easier
reading and manipulation. But unlike apktool, it cannot
assemble back those intermediate class files.
5) JEB [105] is a leading professional reverse-engineering
software for Android apps, available for Windows, Linux
and Mac platforms. It is a GUI-based interactive de-
compiler for security analysts to see content of Android
apps, such as manifest, resources, certificates, literal
strings and examine its decompiled Java source by
providing easy navigation through cross-references. JEB
converts Dalvik bytecode directly into Java source by
better utilizing semantic information present in Dalvik
bytecode, without going through Java bytecode. Excep-
tionally, JEB can also de-obfuscate Dalvik bytecode to
make disassembled code more readable in comparison
to its counterparts [96] [62]. JEB also supports Python
scripts or plugins by allowing access to decompiled Java
code’s Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) through API. This
feature is helpful in automating particular analysis needs.
According to us, it is the best reverse-engineering tool
so far.
B. Androguard
Goal: Risk Assessment, Analysis and Detection
Methodology: Static
Deployment: Off-Device
Androguard [70], an open-source, static analysis tool, can
disassemble and decompile Android apps to make reverse en-
gineering much easier. It can generate control flow graphs for
each method and provides access of all through Python-API,
as well as graphic formats. Androguards unique Normalized
Compression Distance (NCD) approach can find similarities
and differences in code between two apps reliably, which can
also be used to detect repackaging.
It provides a rich API in Python to access disassembled re-
sources and static analysis structures like basic-blocks, control-
flow and instructions of an APK, using which, one can develop
their own static analysis methods. Following are some of
features explained briefly.
1) Code Similarity Among Apps: Androguard finds sim-
ilarities between two apps by calculating Normalized Com-
pression Distance between each method pairs and calculates
a score from 0-100, where 100 means apps are identical.
It displays IDENTICAL, SIMILAR, NEW, DELETED and
SKIPPED methods of first app with respect to another one.
In the same way, it can also display differences between two
methods by comparing each basic blocks pairs. More specif-
ically, to calculate differences between two similar methods,
it first converts each unique instruction in basic block into a
string. Then, it applies Longest Common Subsequence algo-
rithm on these strings of two basic blocks to find differences
between them [106].
Fig. 8: Features of Androguard
2) Risk Indicator: Risk Indicator calculates fuzzy risk score
of an APK from 0 (low risk) to 100 (high risk). It considers
following parameters:
• Native, Reflection, Cryptographic and Dynamic code
presence in an app.
• Number of executables/shared-libraries present in an app.
• Permission requests related to privacy and monetary risks.
• Other Dangerous/SystemOrSignature/Signature permis-
sion requests.
3) Signature Generation and Detection for Malicious Apps:
Androguard manages a database of signatures and provides
an interface to add/remove signatures to/from the database.
Signature is described in a JSON format. It contains a name
(or family-name), set of sub-signatures and a Boolean formula
to mix different sub-signatures. Following are the two types
of sub-signatures:
• METHSIM: It contains three parameters, CN - class
name, MN - method name and D - descriptor.
• CLASSSIM: It contains a single parameter, CN - class
name.
Thus sub-signature can be applied on a specific method
or entire class. Different sub-signatures can be mixed with
Boolean formula (BF).
IEEE COMMUNICATIONS SURVEYS AND TUTORIALS, VOL. 00, NO. 0, FEBRUARY 2014 14
C. Andromaly
Goal: Anomaly Detection
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: Half On-Device, Half Off-Device
In [72], Shabtai et al. have proposed a light-weight An-
droid malware detection system based on machine learning
approach. It performs real-time monitoring for collection of
various system metrics, such as CPU usage, amount of data
transferred through network, number of active processes and
battery usage.
As can be seen in the Figure 9, Andromaly has four major
components:
• Feature Extractors: They collect feature metrics, by com-
municating with Android kernel and application frame-
work. Feature Extractors are triggered at regular intervals
to collect new feature measurements by Feature Manager.
Feature Manager may also perform some pre-processing
on the raw feature data.
• Processor: It is an analysis and detection unit. Its role is
to receive the feature vectors from Main Service, analyze
them and perform threat assessment to Threat Weighting
Unit (TWU). Processors can be rule-based, knowledge-
based classifiers or anomaly detectors employing machine
learning methods. TWU applies ensemble algorithm on
the analysis results received from all the processors to
derive a final decision on device infection. Alert Manager
smoothes the result to avoid false alarms.
• Main Service: It coordinates feature collection, malware
detection and alert process. It is responsible for requesting
new feature measurements, sending new feature met-
rics to processors and receiving final recommendation
from alert manager. Loggers can log information for de-
bugging, calibration and experimentation. Configuration
Manager manages the configuration of the application,
for example, active processors, alert threshold, sampling
interval etc. The task of activating or deactivating proces-
sors is taken care by Processor Manager. Operation Mode
Manager switches application from one mode to another
which can result in activation/deactivation of processors
and feature extractors. This change in operation modes is
resulted due to change in resource levels.
• Graphical User Interface: It interacts with user to config-
ure application parameters, activate/deactivate the appli-
cation, alerts user regarding threats and allows exploring
collected data. Experiments were carried out using few
categories of artificial malware, thus working model
needs testing by real malware.
D. AndroSimilar
Goal: Malware Detection
Methodology: Static
Deployment: Off-Device (Portable to On-Device too)
Parvez et al. [74] proposed AndroSimilar, an automatic
signature generation approach that extracts statistically rare
syntactic features for malware detection. Apart from existing
malware, AndroSimilar is able to reasonably detect obfus-
cated malware with techniques like string encryption, method
renaming, junk method insertion and changing control flow,
widely used to evade fixed anti-malware signature, thus it can
detect unknown variants of existing malware. AndroSimilar
approach is based on Similarity Digest Hash (SDHash) [107]
used in digital forensics to identify similar documents.
Intuitively, completely unrelated apps should have lower
probability of having common features. When two unrelated
Fig. 9: Architecture of Andromaly
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Fig. 10: AndroSimilar Methodology
apps share some features, such features should be considered
weak as using these shall lead to false positives [108]. Fixed-
size byte-sequence features are extracted based on empirical
probability of occurrence of their entropy values, then popular
features are searched among them according to rarity in neigh-
borhood [107]. Figure 10 shows the working of AndroSimilar.
Following are the steps involved:
• Submit Google Play, third-party or an obfuscated mali-
cious app as input to AndroSimilar.
• Generate entropy values for every byte-sequence of fixed
size in a file and normalize these in range of [0, 1000].
• Select statistically robust features according to similarity
digest scheme as representative to the app.
• Store extracted features into Bloom Filters. Sequence of
Bloom Filters is a signature of an app.
• Compare the signature with the database to detect match
with known malware family. If similarity score is beyond
a given threshold, mark it as malicious (or repackaged)
sample.
Thus, they generate signatures of known malware fami-
lies as the representative database. If similarity score of an
unknown app with any existing family signatures matches
beyond a threshold, then it is labeled as malicious.
E. Andrubis
Goal: Malware Analysis and Detection
Methodology: Static and Dynamic
Deployment: Off-Device
Andrubis [109] is a web-based malware analysis platform,
build upon some well-known existing tools. Users can submit
suspicious apps through web interface. After analyzing app on
the remote-server, Andrubis then returns detailed static as well
dynamic analysis report of the same. Andrubis also provides a
rating for app’s behavior between 0-10, where 0 means benign
and 10 means malicious. It is built upon Droidbox [110],
TaintDroid [99], apktool [62] and androguard [70].
F. APKInspector
Goal: Malware Analysis
Methodology: Static
Deployment: Off-Device
APKInspector [111] is a full-fledged static analysis program
for Android apps, combining some of the well-known tools
like Ded [112], smali/baksmali [102], apktool [62] and An-
droguard [70]. It provides a rich GUI and provides following
features:
• Meta-data about app
• Analysis of sensitive permissions
• Displays Dalvik bytecode and Java source code
• Displays control-flow graph
• Displays call-graph, displaying call-in and call-out struc-
tures
• Static instrumentation support by allowing modification
of smali code
G. Aurasium
Goal: Analysis and Detection
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: On-Device
Aurasium [113] is a powerful technique that takes control
of execution of apps, by enforcing arbitrary security policies
at runtime. To be able to do that, Aurasium repackages
the Android apps to include code for policy enforcement.
Aurasium’s Security Manager component can apply policies
not only at individual app level, but across multiple apps
too. Any security and privacy violations are reported to the
user. Thus, it eliminates the need of manipulating Android OS
to monitor app behavior. It intervenes in-case of application
accessing sensitive information such as contacts, messages,
phone identifiers and executing shell-commands by asking user
for confirmation regarding the same.
Limitation of Aurasium is that currently it is not stealthy,
that means it can be detected by apps due to change in app sig-
nature, as well as presence of its native library. Thus, app may
not reveal its malicious behavior, and hence avoiding detection.
As Aurasium depends on repackaging, it may altogether fail
to disassemble (or assemble) an obfuscated app.
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H. Bouncer
Goal: Malware Detection
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: Off-Device
Google protects its own app-store, Google Play, with a
system called Bouncer. It is a virtual machine based dynamic
analysis platform, for testing apps uploaded by third-party de-
velopers, before allowing users to download them. It executes
app to look for any malicious behavior and also compares
it against previously analyzed malicious apps. Though no
documentation of internal functioning is available, Oberheide
et al. [34] presented their analysis of Bouncer environment by
implementing a custom command and control app. Dynamic
code loading techniques have helped evade scrutiny from
Bouncer [114].
I. CopperDroid
Goal: Malware Analysis and Detection
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: Off-Device
Reina et al. proposed CopperDroid [98], a system which
performs system call-centric dynamic analysis of Android
apps, using Virtual Machine Introspection. To address the
path coverage problem, they have supported the stimulation
of events as per the specification present in app’s manifest
file. Authors have shown through experimentation that system
call-centric analysis can effectively detect malicious behavior.
They have also provided a web interface for other users to
analyze apps [115].
J. Crowdroid
Goal: Malware Detection
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: Half On-Device, Half Off-Device
Crowdroid [100] is a behavior based malware detection
system. It has two components, a crowd sourcing app which
need to be installed on user-devices and a remote-server
for malware detection. The crowd sourcing app sends the
behavioral data (i.e., system-call details) in the form of an
application log file to the remote server. Strace, a system utility
present on device is used to collect the system-call details
of the apps. The application log file consists of basic device
information, list of installed applications and behavioral data.
At the remote-server, this data is processed to create feature
vectors which could then be analyzed by 2-means partition
clustering to predict the app as either benign or malicious.
An app report is generated and stored in the database of the
remote server.
Results of Crowdroid are accurate for self-written malware
and promising for some of the real malware. If the malware
is very active, then it is possible to have large difference in
system calls, which can help in detection for the same. But,
it also suffers with false-positives, as demonstrated by authors
using Monkey Jump2, an app with HongTouTou malware.
Limitation of Crowdroid is that crowdsourcing app should
be kept running in the background for monitoring, which can
drain the resources. Also, this technique is yet to be tested
on wide varieties of malware families available, to check its
robustness.
K. Droidbox
Goal: Taint Analysis and Monitoring
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: Off-Device
Droidbox [110] is a dynamic analysis tool based on Taint-
Droid [99] using modified Android framework for API call
analysis. Figure 12 shows static and dynamic analysis oper-
ations performed within Droidbox. App analysis begins with
the static-pre-checking, which includes parsing permissions,
activities and receivers. The app under analysis is executed
Fig. 11: Crowdroid Architecture
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in emulated environment to perform taint-analysis and API
monitoring. Taint-analysis involves labeling (tainting) private
and sensitive data that propagates through program variables,
files and interprocess communication.
Taint-analysis keeps track of tainted data that leaves the
system either through network, file(s) or SMS and the app
that is responsible for transmission. API monitoring involves
API logging with its parameters and return value. The results
generated consist of following:
• Hashes of analyzed apps
• Network data transferred or received
• File read and write operations
• Data leaks
• Circumvented permissions
• Broadcast receivers
• Services started and classes loaded through
DexClassLoader
• SMS sent and dialed calls
• Cryptographic operations with Android API
• Temporal order of operations
• Tree-map for similarity analysis
Fig. 12: Features of Droidbox
Limitation of Droidbox is that it monitors only tasks per-
formed within the Android Framework. If native code leaks
data, it will get unnoticed.
L. DroidMOSS
Goal: Repackaged App Detection
Methodology: Static
Deployment: Off-Device
DroidMOSS [9] is a prototype that detects app repackaging
using semantic file features. More specifically, it extracts DEX
opcode sequence from an app, then generates a signature from
it using fuzzy hashing [116] technique. It also adds developer
certificate information, mapped into unique 32-bit identifier,
into signature. Signatures of two apps are compared with edit-
distance algorithm for calculating similarity score. Proposed
approach is discussed shown in Figure 13.
Intuition behind DroidMOSS of using just opcodes as a
feature is that it might be easy for adversaries to modify
operands, but much harder to change actual opcodes [9]. This
approach has several disadvantages. First, as it considers only
DEX bytecode, ignoring native code and resources of the
app, as resources most of the time are same. Second, opcode
sequence does not contain higher level semantic knowledge.
Smart adversary can easily evade this technique by using ob-
fuscations such as adding junk bytecode, method restructuring,
control flow alteration, which do not contribute to the outcome
of the app.
M. DroidScope
Goal: Analysis
Methodology: Dynamic
Deployment: Off-Device
DroidScope [101] is a Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
based dynamic analysis framework for Android apps. Unlike
other dynamic analysis platforms, it does not reside inside the
emulator, but constructing OS-level and Dalvik-level seman-
tics by residing outside the emulator. Hence, even the privilege
escalation attacks in the kernel can be detected. It also makes
the attackers task of disrupting analysis difficult. DroidScope
is built upon QEMU emulator, and also provides a set of APIs
to customize analysis needs to human analysts. Android mal-
ware families DroidKungFu and DroidDream were analyzed
and detected successfully, however DroidScope’s effectiveness
against other malware families needs to be tested.
N. Drozer
Goal: Risk Assessment using Exploitation
Methodology: Static and Dynamic
Deployment: Half On-Device, Half Off-Device
Drozer [117] is a comprehensive attack and security assess-
ment framework for Android devices, available both as open-
source and professional version. It allows security enforcement
agencies to remotely exploit Android devices in order to find
vulnerabilities and threats associated with them. Figure 14
shows the working of Drozer. Following is the list of features
supported by the Drozer:
• It installs an Agent app on devices that executes exploita-
tion modules using Java Reflection API. At server-side,
one can create their own custom modules in Python and
send it to Agent app to perform exploitation activities on
the devices.
• It can interact with the Dalvik VM to discover installed
packages and related app components. It also allows inter-
action with the app-components such as services, content
providers and broadcast receivers to find vulnerabilities
in them.
• It can create a shell on devices, through which one can
remotely interact with Android OS.
• It allows one to create an exploit by using known root-
ing vulnerability and further combine it with additional
shellcode to get maximum leverage of the device.
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Fig. 13: DroidMOSS Methodology
O. Kirin
Goal: Risk Assessment
Methodology: Static
Deployment: On-Device
In [81] authors propose a security policy enforcement
mechanism, called Kirin, during app installation. Kirin defines
a set of rules regarding the combination certain permissions
requested by an app that could prove to be harmful for the
user-device. If an app fails to satisfy those security rules,
installation is denied. Thus, it rigidly make decisions, based
on set of rules, on-behalf of the users.
P. TaintDroid
Goal: Taint Analysis
Methodology: Dynamic and Android Instrumentation
Deployment: Off-Device
TaintDroid [99] extends the Android platform to track
privacy sensitive information-flow within third-party apps for
leak. The sensitive data is automatically tainted (or labeled)
in order to keep track whether it leaves the device. When
the sensitive data leaves the system, TaintDroid records the
label of data and the app which sent the data along with its
destination.
Taint propagation is tracked at four levels of granularity, 1)
Variable-level, 2) Method-level, 3) Message-level and 4) File-
level. Variable-level tracking uses variable semantics, which
provides necessary context to avoid taint propagation. In
message-level tracking, the taint on messages is tracked to
avoid IPC overhead. Method-level tracking is used for Android
native libraries that are not directly accessible to apps but
through modified firmware. Lastly file-level tracking ensures
integrity of file-access activities by checking whether taint
markings are retained.
Lets consider working of TaintDroid with a scenario, where
data of one trusted app is accessed by some untrusted app and
sent over network. This is shown in the Figure 15. Firstly,
the information of the trusted app is labeled according to its
context. A native method is called which interfaces Dalvik
VM interpreter to store taint markings in a virtual taint map.
Every interpreter simultaneously propagates taint tags accord-
ing to data-flow rules. The Binder library of the TaintDroid is
modified to ensure the tainted data of the trusted application
is sent as a parcel having a taint tag reflecting the combined
taint markings of all contained data. The kernel transfers this
parcel transparently to reach Binder library instance at the
untrusted app. The taint tag is retrieved from the parcel and
marked to all the contained data by the Binder library instance.
Dalvik bytecode interpreter forwards these taint tags along
with requested data towards untrusted app component. When
that app calls taint sink (for example, network) library, it
retrieves taint tag and marks that app’s activity as malicious.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Android is a core delivery platform providing ubiquitous
services for connected smartphone paradigm, thus monetary
gains have prompted malware authors to employ various attack
Fig. 14: Working of Drozer
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Fig. 15: Taint propagation in TaintDroid
vectors to target Android platform. Due to large increase
in unique malware app signature(s) and known limitations
of Android security, signature based methods are not suf-
ficient against unseen, cryptographic and transformed code.
Researchers have proposed various behavioral approaches to
guard the centralized app markets as malware authors are tar-
geting app stores to pollute online distribution mechanisms. In
this review, we discuss android security and its issues, Android
OS limitations, malware penetration and its implications on
android ecosystem, prominent security solutions visualizing a
generic analysis and detection approach.
Due to enormous popularity of Android platform among
consumers and developers malware authors see an opportunity
to gain monetary benefits out of them and thus android
malware apps is a big threat. Between 2010 to 2013, there
is an increase of hundreds of malware apps using stealth
techniques to bypass commercial anti-malware products. Ta-
ble I lists summary of some prominent analysis, malwaer app
detection methods according to their goal, methodology and
deployment. Summary shows there is no single solution that
addresses each issue.
Androguard is a robust, android open source to develop
custom static analysis tool(s). Andrubis and APKInspector
leverages Androguard for app analysis. To study the behavior
rating of Andrubis, we implemented a custom SMS based bot-
net, uploaded at Andrubis web service and obtained 9.9/10.0
malicious rating where as same app on VirusTotal with 47
commercial anti malware failed to detect the unseen sample.
We report Andrubis’ behavior rating feature is robust agaisnt
zero day malware apps.
DroidMOSS and AndroSimilar employ fuzzy hashing ap-
proach for repackaged apps, new malware variant(s) detec-
tion rather than conventional signature based method. As-
rRepackaging and code tranformation are easy on android
platform, it is worth evaluating research directions to propose
mitigation of such issues. Androguard leverages Dalvik byte-
code, whereas DroidMOSS employs Dalvik opcode sequence
whereas, AndroSimilar works on raw byte features. Evaluation
of DroidMOSS is not possible due to unavailability of its
source code thus prototype needs to be compared against
existing approaches. AndroSimilar and Androguard are tested
to report that latter gives an accurate similarity score be-
tween two related apps in comparison to former method.
Androguard being a semantic approach, takes long time to
generate similarity score in comparison with AndroSimilar, a
byte based approach. Thus, AndroSimilar is more suitable to
be ported as Android app to detect unseen malware variants.
We believe AndroSimilar is a promising approach against
malware app variant. To tackle wide variety of new malware,
a comprehensive evaluation framework incorporating robust
static and dynamic methods can be proposed on Android
platform.
Android malware threats are persistent due to large number
of devices still running on older and vulnerable OS versions.
Section VIII discusses, static and dynamic analysis approach.
Both approaches can be used separately, each one has its
own limitation(s). Static analysis can be thwarted by em-
ploying encryption and/or transformation techniques discussed
in Section VII. Dynamic analysis can be evaded by several
anti-emulation techniques covered in Section VIII-B. Manual
analysis has become infeasible due to a big increase in the
number of unknown malware samples.
We propose an automated, hybrid approach for Android
malware analysis. Architecture of the proposed approach
shown in Figure 16 is our proposed future research. As given
in the diagram, APK file is dissected with static analysis. In
case of its failure against encrypted code, dynamic analysis
performs behavioral detection. Static and Dynamic analysis
generate app activity reports to assist a malware analysts to
decide upon unknown suspicious sample. Finally, we conclude
that hybrid detection approach(s) are gaining prominence for
analyzing malware.
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